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NOTES AND COMMENTS

THE EFFECT AND
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF
SECTION 250 OF THE NEW YORK
DOMESTIC RELATIONS LAW
The one hundred and seventy-nine year
tenure of adultery as the sole ground for
divorce in New York 1 will come to an
end on September 1, 1967 when New

tween the originally proposed bill, the
Wilson-Sutton Bill,' and a more restrictive
measure subsequently introduced by the
leaders of the Assembly and Senate. 4 One
section of the "leaders'" bill, enacted as
Section 250 of the Domestic Relations
Law, may affect the recognition of outof-state ex parte divorces. 5 This section,

York's liberalized divorce law becomes effective. Under the amendments to the
Domestic Relations Law, the grounds for
divorce shall include: cruel and inhuman
treatment, abandonment for a period of

two years, confinement to prison for three
years, adultery (including deviate intercourse), and living apart for two years
pursuant to a written separation agree-

ment, or pursuant to a separation decree.2
The law, as enacted, is a compromise be-

' N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 170 (formerly CPA
§ 1147). The law was subject to much critical
comment. E.g., "New York's ...
divorce law
...
with its single ground, adultery is the least
liberal in the nation."
N.Y. Times, Apr. 25,
1966, p. 30 (Editorial).
2 N.Y. Sess. Laws 1966, ch. 254.

3This bill was drafted by a committee authorized
to study the existing divorce law and to recommend changes. The bill would have added
several new grounds for divorce, including a
provision that a couple who had lived apart
for two years by mutual verbal agreement could
obtain a divorce. This provision was criticized
as providing "divorce by consent." N.Y. Times,
Apr. 28, 1966, p. 36, col. 1.
4 The "leaders'" bill permitted a divorce after a
five year separation, if the separation started
with a court decree. Id. at col. 2.
-The statute can have little effect on bilateral
sister-state divorce decrees. As early as 1938,
the Supreme Court of the United States held
that where a defendant appeared in a foreign
state and contested the jurisdiction of the court,
a finding of jurisdiction by that court was res
judicata and could not be collaterally attacked.
Davis v. Davis, 305 U.S. 32 (1938).
In 1948
the Court held, in Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S.
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which adopts Section 2 of the Uniform
Divorce Recognition Act, 6 already enacted
in ten other jurisdictionsJ provides:
Proof that a person obtaining a divorce
in another jurisdiction was

343 (1948), that appearance by the defendant
in the foreign state precluded subsequent litigation of the jurisdictional issue, provided that
there was full opportunity for him to litigate.
See also Coe v. Coe, 334 U.S. 378 (1948). See
generally Siegel, MCKINNEY'S COMMENTARY ON
THE DOMESTIC RELATIONS LAW 36-40 (1964).
Section 250 of the Domestic Relations Law
appears to apply equally to bilateral and ex
parte divorces. Clearly, however, in any conflict between the statute and the Supreme Court
decisions concerning bilateral divorces, the statute
must give way. See generally Commissioners'
Notes, UNIFORM DIVORCE RECOGNITION ACT
§ 2, 9A U.L.A. 457, 470, comment a (1965).
69A U.L.A. 457, 470 (1965).

7California (1949), Louisiana (1952), Montana
(1963), Nebraska (1949), New Hampshire
(1949), North Dakota (1951), Rhode Island
(1949), South Carolina (1950), Washington
(1949), Wisconsin (1949). 9A U.L.A. 457
(1965). These states also enacted Section 1
of the Uniform Divorce Recognition Act which
reads:
A divorce from the bonds of matrimony
obtained in another jurisdiction shall be of
no force or effect in this state, if both

parties to the marriage were domiciled in
this state at the time the proceeding for
the divorce was commenced. Id. at 461.
(Emphasis added.)
It has been suggested that this section was not
adopted by the New York Legislature because
the law of the state already adheres to this
principle. 9 McKINNEY'S FORMS, MATRIMONIAL
& FAMILY LAW, supp. commentary 26 (1966).
However, to the extent that this section conflicts with the rule limiting collateral attack of
an ex parte foreign divorce where the attacking
party had obtained the divorce in the first instance, it would have changed the law of this
state. See Krause v. Krause, 282 N.Y. 355, 26
N.E.2d 290 (1940); Starbuck v. Starbuck, 173
N.Y. 503, 66 N.E. 193 (1903). The section
is also subject to the limitations of Sherrer v.
Sherrer, supra note 5.

(a) domiciled in this state within twelve

months prior to the commencement of
the proceeding therefor, and resumed
residence in this state within eighteen
months after the date of his departure
therefrom, or
(b) at all times after his departure from
this state and until his return maintained a place of residence within this
state, shall be prima facie evidence that
the person was domiciled in this state
when the divorce proceeding commenced.8

As a rule of evidence,) this act is clearly
intended by its draftsmen to restrict, within constitutional limits, the utility of extraterritorial migratory divorce decrees. 10
However, it has been criticized as possibly violative of the full faith and credit
clause of the federal constitution to the
extent that it might affect the prima facie
validity accorded sister-state divorce decrees." Thus, it is the purpose of this
comment to examine section 250, its effect
on prior law, and its constitutionality.

s N.Y. Sess. Laws 1966, ch. 254, § 11. The act
was drawn carefully distinguishing between the
concepts of "domicile" and "residence." See
Commissioners' Notes, UNIFORM DIVORCE RECOGNITION ACT § 2, 9A U.L.A. 457, 471 (1965).
"Residence means living in a particular locality,
but domicile means living in that locality with
intent to make it a fixed and permanent home."
Matter of Newcomb, 192 N.Y. 238, 250, 84
N.E. 950, 954 (1908).
9 See Commissioners' Notes, UNIFORM DIVORCE
RECOGNITION ACT § 2, 9A U.L.A. 457-60 (1965).
10 See Commissioners' Prefatory Note, UNIFORM
DIVORCE

RECOGNITION

(1965).
11 See, The

Work

of

ACT,
the

9A U.L.A. 457
1949

California

Legislature, 23 So. CALIF. L. REV. 7 (1949).
Contra, Merrill, The Utility of Divorce Recognition Statutes in Dealing with the Problem of
Migratory Divorce, 27 TEXAS L. REV. 291

(1949).

13
Sister-State Decrees
The individual states vary greatly as to
the grounds upon which a divorce will be
granted." Consequently, citizens of states
such as New York, with comparatively
strict grounds for divorce, have fled to
more liberal jurisdictions, procuring what
have since become known as migratory
divorce decrees.1 3 Historically, the question of whether a state is required to
recognize the divorce decrees of a sister
state has been the subject of much debate
4

and confusion.1

The United States Constitution provides
that "Full Faith and Credit shall be given
in each state to the . . . judicial proceedings of every other state." 15 During the
nineteenth century, a vast majority of state
courts afforded recognition to sister-state
ex parte decrees of divorce.' 6 In 1901,
the United States Supreme Court held that
an ex parte decree issued by the state of
matrimonial domicile was binding on all

For a complete listing of the grounds available
for divorce in each of the states as of July
1, 1965 see AM. JuR. 2d Desk Book Doc. No.
125 (Supp. 1966).

22

13 See generally Overton, Sister State Divorces,
22 TENN. L. REV. 891 (1953); Paulsen, Migratory Divorce: Chapters III and IV. The appearance of Sherrer and the Ghost of Haddock,

24

IND. L.J. 25 (1948).
See Merrill, supra note 11, at 291-95. If a
foreign divorce decree is not recognized, a remarriage may result in a prosecution for
bigamy, the children of the second marriage may
be deemed illegitimate, and many other incidents
of life would be rendered uncertain. On the
other hand, recognition of a foreign decree may
mean that a state with liberal divorce laws will
infringe upon the social policy of a state with
more restrictive standards.
15 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
14

16 Foster, For Better or Worse? Decisions Since

Haddock v. Haddock, 47 A.B.A.J. 963 (1961).
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courts, 17 but full faith and credit was not
mandatory for divorce based on constructive service where neither party was
domiciled in the state issuing the decree.1 8 Subsequently, in Haddock v. Haddock,' 9 the Court held that an ex parte
decree, outside the matrimonial domicile,
was not entitled to full faith and credit
even though the party who had obtained
the decree was

a bona fide domiciliary

of the state which dissolved the marriage.
The Haddock rule remained in force until

1942, when the Supreme Court in Williams v. North Carolina20 (hereinafter referred to as

Williams I)

expressly over-

ruled it, holding that the Constitution re-

quired an ex parte divorce, based on constructive service and granted to a party

domiciled
forded

21

in the issuing state, be af-

full faith and credit.

However,

Williams I was subsequently limited by

17 Atherton v. Atherton, 181 U.S. 155 (1901).
1s Streitwolf v. Streitwolf, 181 U.S. 179 (1901);
Bell v. Bell, 181 U.S. 175 (1901).
10 201 U.S. 562 (1906). Note that this decision
did not prevent the recognition of sister-state
decrees on the basis of comity; this is the
basis upon which divorce decrees of foreign
countries are recognized since the full faith and
credit clause is not applicable. See generally
Comment, 32 U. CHI. L. REV. 800, 802
(1965).
20317 U.S. 287 (1942).
21The classical definition of domicile was expressed by Justice Holmes in Williamson v.
Osenton, 232 U.S. 619 (1914), where he stated:
"The very
meaning
of domicil
is the
technically preeminent headquarters that every
person is compelled to have in order that certain
rights and duties that have been attached to
it by the law may be determined." Id. at
625. 'The essential fact that raises a change of
abode to
a change of domicil is the
absence of any intention to live elsewhere
.... "Id. at 624.
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Williams 11,22 in which the Supreme Court
held that the determination of domicile by
the state issuing the decree in an ex parte
proceeding is not final. Domicile is the
jurisdictional foundation of the divorce decree, and a sister state is free to inquire
as to whether the party who had obtained
the decree had committed a fraud on the
courts of the issuing state by failing to become a bona fide domiciliary. Should the
sister state find, therefore, that a fraud had
been perpetrated and that jurisdiction
was nonexistent, full faith and credit
need not be afforded. The Court pointed
out, however, that "the burden of undermining the verity which the . . . [foreign]

decrees import rests heavily upon the assailant. '' 23

Furthermore, although not set-

ting precise standards, the Court stated
that the "finding .. . [of domicile by the

sister state may be] overturned only by
relevant standards of proof," 24 and must
be "fairly assessed on cogent evidence." 25
Although these standards have not since

22Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226
(1945). In Williams I, both parties, domiciled
in North Carolina, left their respective spouses
in that state, obtained ex parte divorces in
Nevada, married, and returned to North Carolina to live. They were then prosecuted and
convicted for bigamous cohabitation. The Supreme Court reversed since the conviction appeared to rest solely on North Carolina's blanket
refusal to recognize ex parte foreign decrees.
The case was retried and the petitioners were
again convicted. The Supreme Court affirmed
(Williams 11), holding that Nevada's finding of
domicile could be collaterally impeached by
North Carolina without violating the full faith
and credit clause and that petitioners' convictions on that basis, were valid.
23Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226,
233-34 (1945).
241d. at 236.
25 Ibid.

been elaborated upon, they remain the
norm by which the question of domicile is
to be adjudicated. Also, in the companion case, Esenwein v. Commonwealth,

the Court explicitly stated that "the Full
Faith and Credit Clause placed the

. .

.

[examining] courts under duty to accord
prima facie validity to the .. . [foreign]

decree."

26

Interpretation of Section 250

Section 250 of the Domestic Relations
Law attempts to provide statutory standards of proof by which to judge the
question of domicile where the validity of
a foreign divorce decree is being contested.
The statute declares that proof that a party
procured a foreign divorce within twelve
months after being domiciled in the state,
and resumed residence within eighteen
months of departure or continuously maintained a residence within the state during
his absence shall be "prima facie evidence"
that the party obtaining the divorce was
domiciled in this state at the time the divorce action was commenced.
In light of the constitutional mandate
that presumptive validity be accorded sister-state divorce decrees, the propriety of
section 250 would appear to depend on
the possible interpretations given its key
words, "prima facie evidence." This
phrase appears susceptible of at least two
interpretations. First, proof by the person attacking the foreign decree of the
facts called for by the statute may serve
to create a presumption of law

27

which

26325 U.S. 279, 280 (1945).
27 "A presumption may be defined as a rule of
law 'which requires that a particular inference
must be drawn from an ascertained state of
facts . . . .' This inference . . . continues until
it is overcome by sufficient evidence to the

13

would rebut the decree's presumptive validity.
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In construing section 250, the New York

This would shift to the defendant

courts will be at liberty to adopt either

the burden of coming forward with "sub-

interpretation of the phrase "prima facie
evidence," subject only to constitutional

stantial" 28 evidence proving domicile to
overcome the presumption of no change
of domicile raised by the statute. The
presumption notwithstanding, the plaintiff
would still have the burden of proof on
the issue of domicile,2" but would be greatly aided by the operation of the statute.

limitations. This is due to the lack of
legislative pronouncements 31 which would
aid the courts in choosing any one interpretation. However, there is some common-law authority that "prima facie evidence" connotes a presumption of law

Alternatively, the statute might be inter-

rather than a mere inference. 3 2 This ap-

preted as calling for proof of facts which
merely fulfill the attacking party's burden
of coming forward with evidence to put
the issue of domicile in question, and

pears to have been the intent of the framers of the uniform act, 33 but there appears
to be no binding statutory authority in
New York which would dictate such an

thereby protect him, as plaintiff, from a

interpretation.

directed verdict. The foreign decree would

There is little doubt that interpreting

remain prima facie valid, and neither the

section 250 as being capable of raising a

burden of coming forward nor the burden
of proof would shift to the defendant. 0

presumption of law of no change of dom-

Under such an interpretation, "prima facie
evidence" would bring forth only an
inference from which the trier of fact may,
but need not, conclude that the party relying on the foreign decree had never relinquished his domicile.
contrary." RICHARDSON, EVIDENCE § 54 (9th ed.
1964).
28Id. at § 57.
29 Should the statute be interpreted as shifting
the burden of proof rather than shifting the
burden of coming forward on the issue of
domicile, it would seem to be in direct conflict
with the Supreme Court's position that the
burden of undermining the foreign decree is
heavily upon the assailant. The importance of
this burden was further emphasized in Rice v.
Rice, 336 U.S. 674 (1949), where the Court
stated: "we have concluded that the Connecticut
courts gave proper weight to the claims of
power by the Nevada court, that the burden
of proving that the decedent had not acquired
a domicile in Nevada was placed upon . . .
[the one challenging the decree]." Id. at 675.
(Emphasis added.)
30 See supra note 29.

icile would effect a substantial change,
both procedurally and substantively, in existing New York law. The statute would
be a procedural innovation to the extent
that there would now be a set quantum
31 "The Committee on Matrimonial and Family

Laws did not consider DRL § 250.
Consequently, the committee report does not contain
any study of section 250."
9 McKINNEY'S
FORMS, MATRIMONIAL AND FAMILY LAW, supp.
commentary 25 (1966). Thus the only evidence
of intent are the notes of the Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws, UNIFORM DIVORCE
RECOGNITION ACT § 2, 9A U.L.A. 457, 470-71
(1965), which are not binding on the New York
courts.
32 See People v. Thacher, 1 Thomp. & C.,
158, 167-68 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1873), where "prima
facie evidence" is defined as "an inference or
presumption of law affirmative or negative of a
fact, in the absence of proof; or until proof can
be attained or produced to overcome the inference." See also BLACK, LAW DICTIONARY 700
(3d ed. 1933).
3 See Commissioners' Notes, UNIFORM DIVORCE
RECOGNITION ACT § 2, 9A U.L.A. 457, 471,
comment c (1965).
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of facts which, once proven, would rebut
the prima facie validity of the foreign divorce decree. Heretofore, no such "measuring stick" by which to judge domicile
existed, and each case appears to have
been treated sui generisA4
Also, substantively, it appears that proof of the
facts required by the statute had not always been enough to defeat the presumptive validity of foreign decrees. In a
leading New York case, Matter of
Holmes,3 5 it was established that the party
relying on the foreign decree had been a
New York domiciliary, had gone to Nevada, obtained an ex parte divorce, remarried and resumed residence in New
York-all within a period of eight months.
While the facts proven by the attacking
party would now clearly fall within subsection (a) of section 250, the decree was
considered prima facie valid. 6 In fact,
the Court stated that the assailant had
"not, in the agreed statement of facts, or
by presentation or offer of evidence . . .
[adequately] challenged the decision of
the Nevada court that the . . . [party]
had acquired a domicile in Nevada sufficient to support the jurisdiction of that
court. . . .,17 Had section 250 then
existed, it would appear that the presumptive validity of the foreign decree
would have been overcome.
4 See Shuart v. Shuart, 183 Misc. 270, 51
N.Y.S.2d 359 (Sup. Ct. 1944) where it was
stated: "The Williams case [Williams I] . . .
did not speak on the subject of what con-

stitutes a bona fide domicile . . . and until this

definition has been made by legislation or
otherwise, we are to apply such common sense
and homely rules as take account of true
actualities rather than glib expressions of intention." Id. at 272, 51 N.Y.S.2d at 362.
35 291 N.Y. 261, 52 N.E.2d 424 (1943).
36 Id. at 272-73, 52 N.E.2d at 430.
31 Id. at 272, 52 N.E.2d at 430.

Constitutionality
Under the first interpretation, the inquiry becomes whether the legislature may,
consistent with the requirements of the
full faith and credit clause, provide for
a statutory presumption of law. To the
extent that section 250 would create a
presumption of invalidity of a foreign
divorce only when certain facts are initially proven, it does not arbitrarily disregard the constitutional requirement that
foreign decrees be considered prima facie
valid. Indeed, it might be argued that
the statute is constitutional in that it merely
prescribes the quantum of evidence that
the assailant must bring forth to defeat
the presumption of bona fide domicile in
the issuing state. However, any rule of
evidence creating a presumption which in
effect defeats a constitutionally compelled
presumption of validity would have to
meet two tests: first, that of the due
process clause, and second, that of "relevant standards of proof" and "cogent
evidence" called for by the Supreme Court
in Williams I.
The constitutional propriety of a presumption is generally tested under the due
process clause by inquiring if there is a
reasonable or rational connection between
the underlying facts proven and the fact
to be presumed.3
However, this test
appears to be satisfied even when the
logical connection between proven and
presumed facts is tenuous.3
It would
seem that a presumption of no change of

s United States v. Gainey, 380 U.S. 63, 66-67
(1965); Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463,
466-67 (1943).
39 See Comment, The California Evidence Code:
Presumptions, 53 CALIF. L. REV. 1439, 1467-71
(1965).
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domicile under section 250 would, in almost all cases, meet the requirement of a
"rational connection" between facts proven
and facts presumed. There may be rare
instances in which a reasonable inference
of fraudulent domicile could not be drawn,
e.g., where a party, who had been domiciled in New York, left the state for a
considerable period of time, obtained a
foreign divorce, returned and established
a permanent residence after having no
contact with New York other than the
continuous maintenance of a summer
home. It would seem, however, that
proof of a continuous maintenance of a
residence in New York or the moving out
of and back into the state shortly before
and after the divorce would most often
meet the due process test for a presumption. There would be a "rational
connection" between the facts proven under the statute and the presumption that
the person never intended to, and therefore did not, relinquish his New York
domicile.
Assuming that the statutory presumption
would meet the requirements of due
process, does it provide the "relevant
standards of proof" and "cogent evidence"
required by the Supreme Court to overturn a foreign divorce decree? For example, suppose that H and W are domiciled in New York. In 1968, while
maintaining a residence here, H moves
to Ohio. Two years after arrival he obtains an ex parte divorce from W in
Ohio, and remains there until 1978 when
he returns to the residence he has continuously maintained in New York. At
that time W commences suit to declare the
Ohio divorce invalid, alleging and proving
that H maintained a residence in New
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York at all times during his absence from
the state. Under the terms of section
250(b), W would have raised a presumption that H was a New York domiciliary at the time the divorce was granted,
and, therefore, would have established a
basis for holding the decree invalid. Assuming that H introduced no evidence of
intent to establish Ohio domicile, absent
evidence to rebut the presumption, and
any constitutional objection, the jury must
find for W, declaring the decree invalid.
Also, it is a common occurrence that the
party who obtained the foreign decree is
deceased or otherwise unavailable where
a foreign divorce is being attacked. 0 Absent "substantial" evidence of H's intent
to establish foreign domicile (invaluable
evidence of which would be H's own testimony) the decree would be held invalid.
While the Supreme Court has never
explicitly defined what is meant by "relevant standards of proof" and "cogent evidence," (and in light of its statements to
the effect that the onus is heavily upon
the plaintiff to disprove domicile), it seems
doubtful that satisfaction of the statutory
facts is a sufficient basis for determining
that a sister-state decree will not be given
full faith and credit. Moreover, the full
faith and credit clause may represent such
strong public policy that it prohibits a
state "from establishing a presumption
which shifts to the party relying upon
a foreign judgment the burden of show4
ing jurisdiction .
.1

40 See, e.g., Matter of Lindgren, 293 N.Y. 18,
55 N.E.2d 849 (1944); In re Bourne, 142
N.Y.S.2d 777 (Surr. Ct. 1955).
4 Marsh, The Uniform Divorce Recognition
Act: Sections 20 and 21 of the Divorce Act
of 1949, 24 WASH. L. REV. 259, 265 (1949).
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In light of the foregoing, it seems reasonable that the second interpretation suggested, i.e., that the statute raises only an
inference from which the jury may, but
need not, conclude that the party relying
on the foreign decree remained a New
York domiciliary at the time he obtained
it, will be adopted and the constitutionality of section 250 preserved. Under this
interpretation, its main function would be
to discharge plaintiff's initial burden of
coming forward to refute the decree's presumptive validity, and thereby protect
against a directed verdict without forcing
the party relying on the decree to come
forward at all. This interpretation too
has its drawbacks. It is apparent that
the draftsmen of this section of the uniform act intended that it change the law
of all states, by placing a procedural hurdle
in the path of the party relying on a sisterstate divorce and weighting the scales, to
some degree, in favor of the party attacking it. 42 However, it seems that under
existing law, proof of the facts required
by the act would, in most cases, even
absent the statute, be sufficient to raise
the question of domicile, and thereby avoid
a pre-emptory ruling, the question being
one for the jury. 43 Viewed in this light,
it would seem that the only possible
change on prior law is the creation of
an inference of fraudulent domicile in the
rare cases in which such an inference
could not otherwise reasonably be drawn.
Where the facts proven under the statute
were such that reasonable men could not
differ on the question of domicile, the
party relying on the decree could rest se-

42

43

Id. at 262.
Id. at 261, n.4.

curely on the prima facie validity of the
foreign decree since any statutorily raised
inference could be abrogated by granting
summary judgment or a directed verdict.
Only if, on appeal, a court ruled that the
facts proven under the statute proved
fraudulent domicile as "a matter of law"
and reversed, would the question of whether
the sister-state decree has been given full
faith and credit arise. Thus, if interpreted
as an inference which makes domicile
a question of fact, section 250 could be
left intact as a rule of evidence merely
codifying existing law, and thus would
be in harmony with the full faith and
credit clause.
Conclusion
Whether interpreted as giving rise to a
presumption of law or as merely creating
an inference, and thus a question of fact,
Section 250 of the Domestic Relations
Law is subject to serious criticism. It
appears that any substantial change the
statute could effect on the law of New
York would be in violation of the full
faith and credit clause. Interpreting the
statute to preserve its constitutionality reduces its effect to a mere codification of
existing law. Despite these criticisms, it
may be argued that the act will serve well
as a pronouncement of public policy, i.e.,
that New York intends to exercise, within
constitutional limitations, great authority
4
over the marital status of her citizens. 1

44 See Commissioners' Prefatory Note, UNIFORM
DIVORCE RECOGNITION ACT, § 2, 9A U.L.A. 457
(1965).

"This Act is ...

[designed] to main-

tain the control of the states over the marital
status of their domiciliaries to the fullest extent
permissible under the Constitution of the United
States." Id. at 459.

13
This would seem logical in light of the
liberalization of the New York divorce
law and the concomitant decreased need
for a sympathetic attitude toward those
who seek sister-state divorces. However,
section 250 is not the product of extensive
investigation by the legislature. 45 It is a
remnant of the "leader's" bill, a measure
belatedly introduced in opposition to the
more liberal Wilson-Sutton Bill, and appears to have been passed as a concession to forces which could have delayed
or defeated the vital provisions of the new
law expanding the state's grounds for
divorce. Thus, it is not clear to what
extent section 250 embodies strong public
policy in New York.
Section 2 of the Uniform Divorce
Recognition Act (section 250) has been
law in several states for more than fifteen
years. In that time it appears to have
been relied on only rarely, 46 and it appears that no court has passed upon the
question of its constitutionality. 47 When
the statute has encountered constitutional
challenge, the issue has been avoided by
deciding that the evidence at trial sufficiently proved lack of domicile, without
reliance upon the statute.4 s Also, at-
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torneys have been advised not to rely
on the statute in view of its possible invalidity.4 9 It further appears that proof
of the facts called for by the statute will
often provide, in itself, a fairly strong
inference that the party relying on the
foreign divorce decree was never a bona
fide domiciliary of the issuing state. It
has recently been noted that not one
case has been found in California, where
the statute has been in effect for a considerable period of time, in which the application of the act brought about a result
different from that which would have been
reached under prior law.50
There is little indication that the act
will serve a more useful purpose in New
York. The courts of this state have never
hesitated to void an ex parte divorce where
it was found that the divorced party was
not a domiciliary of the state which dissolved the marriage. 51 It would thus seem
that in light of the doubtful constitutionality of interpreting section 250 in a manner that would substantially change the law
of New York, the impact of the statute in
the state will be limited to a codification
of prior law, and, perhaps, an indication
that New York intends to discourage its
citizens from obtaining sister-state divorce
decrees.

45Supra note 31.
46 See Kerr v. Kerr, 182 Cal. App. 2d 12, 5
Cal. Rptr. 630 (Dist. Ct. App. 1960); Yost
v. Yost, 161 Neb. 164, 72 N.W.2d 689 (1955).
47 See Note, Foreign Divorce Recognition in
California, 16 HASTINGS L.J. 121, 129 (1964).
48 See Dietrich
v. Dietrich, 41 Cal. 2d 497,
261 P.2d 269 (1953); Carmichael v. Carmichael,
216 Cal. App. 2d 674, 31 Cal. Rptr. 514 (Dist.
Ct. App. 1963).

49

Marsh, supra note 41, at 265.

50 Supra note 47, at 129.
5 See, e.g., Bajkynicz v. Bajkynicz, 5 App. Div.

2d 562,

173 N.Y.S.2d 777 (4th Dep't 1958);

Aspromonte v. Aspromonte, 4 App. Div. 2d 689,
164 N.Y.S.2d 299 (2d Dep't 1957); Fox v.
Pox, 23 Misc. 2d 504, 206 N.Y.S.2d 317 (Sup.
Ct. 1960).

